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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH LeROY PETERSON and 
KATHRYN PEDERS·EN PETER-
SON, 
Plaintiffs a;nd Respondents, 
-vs.-
CUMORAH S. ELDREDGE 
Defendant and A.ppella;nt, 
Case No. 7768 
RESPONDENT-S' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FAC-TS 
We shall refer to the parties as they appeared in 
the court below. It is felt necessary to present a more 
complete and accurate statement of facts than appears 
in the defendant's brief so the court may have this in-
formation before it. 
On the northeast corner of 7th Avenue and D Street 
in Salt Lake City is located a large house which faces 
south onto 7th Avenue with 55 ft. frontage on 7th Avenue. 
Back of the house is a triplex which faces west onto D 
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2 
Street. The two properties occupy 165 feet on D Street. 
The house property was purchased by the parents of the 
plaintiff, Joseph LeRoy Peterson, in April, 1935. The 
Petersons moved into and occupied the house as the 
family home (R. 34). In 1938 the parents of the plaintiff, 
Joseph LeRoy Peterson, purchased the triplex. R. 35. 
The back yard of the house, including the strip in dispute 
was all in lawn when the Peter sons purchased the house. 
R. 70. They rehabilitated the lawn and during the three-
year interval from 1935 to 1938 and thereafter the Peter-
son family used and cared for, as the back yard of said 
house, the ground to the edge of a sidewalk which runs 
along the south side of the triplex and around to the 
rear of the triplex. R. 17, 42. A wooden fence running 
east and west, extending from the east property line a 
short distance west so as p~artially to separate the two 
properties existed when the house was purchased by the 
PeteTsons in 1935. R. 18, 19. Sometime during the. period 
of 1935 to 1937 the Petersons installed a sprinkling sys-
tem in the back yard, which watered the back yard area 
up to the edge of the sidewalk along the south side of 
the triplex. R. 18. The plaintiff, J ose·ph LeRoy Peterson, 
lived in the large house from July, 1935, until February, 
1937, and the plaintiff, Kathryn Pedersen Peterson, was 
a frequent visitor at the home during this same period 
of time. Both of the-m became acquainted with the yard 
as it existed at that time and as is described herein. 
In 1944 the plaintiffs purchased the house and triplex 
from the mother of the plaintiff, Joseph LeRoy Peterson, 
and moved into the house as their family home. The 
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triplex was rented as incon1e property. Also in 1944, 
plaintiffs built a ne'v fence running from east to west 
completely ·separating the house from the triplex and 
continuing so as to enclose the back yard 'of the house. 
The new fence was placed imm-ediately south of the side-
walk which. runs along the south end of the triplex· and in 
line with the old section of wooden fence which was re-
placed by the n.ew fence. R. 19-22, 43, 44. The fence was 
constructed of 6 ft. "T" iron posts extending 4% ft. out 
of the ground with wire stock fencing 4 ft. high fastened 
to the posts. R. 22. After that it was necessary to go 
around the fence to get from the· house to the triplex.· 
On February 23, 1949, plaintiff, Kathryn Pedersen 
Peterson, listed the house ·and triplex for sale separately 
with Inland Realtors. R. 46. The listing cards were made 
out by the· realty co1npany salesman, who obtained infor-
mation from the plaintiff, l(athryn Pedersen Peterson. 
These listing cards indicated the house p.rop·erty as· being 
approximately 80 ft. along D Street and 60· fe·et along 
7th Avenue and the triplex as having approximately 
50 feet frontage along D Street and a depth o[ approx-
imately 60 feet. The defendant inspected the triplex 
property on two occasions and on March 5, 1949, signed 
an earnest money agreement 'vhich agreement contained 
no mention of the size of the lot. R. 62, Ex. C: ·The 4 ft. 
fence separating the properties was there when she made 
her inspections and she saw it. R. 58, 59. The fence at 
that time completely separated the properties except that 
at the extreme east end of the fence the fencing had been 
pushed or tramped down so that it was easy to get across 
the fence at that point. 
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Later in March, 1949, plaintiffs as sellers, and de-
fendant as buyer, executed the uniform real estate con-
tract which is the subject of this action. Ex. 1. When 
the defendant purchased the triplex she had not consid-
ered the size of the lot at all. R. 60, 63. She was inter-
ested in the size of the rooms, and when she signed the 
real estate contract was the first time she saw any legal 
description of the p·roperty, and even at that time she did 
not pay any attention to the frontage she was buying. 
R. 62, 63. Defendant had no reason to believe her prop-
erty extended south of the fence because it had been 
represented to her otherwise. R. 63. Sometime in June, 
1949, defendant asked the plaintiffs to sell her three or 
more feet south of the fence but they declined. R. 61. 
In January, 1951, ahnost two years after executing the 
contract, defendant first learned that the fence line did 
not correspond with the property as described in the 
contract. R. 60. It was only after making this discovery 
that the defendant ever made any claim to the property 
south of the fence. R. 64. Plaintiffs, during the smnmers 
of 1949 and 1950, used ·as a back yard for lawn and 
flowers the area up the south side of the wire fence. 
Vines and morning-glories planted by the plaintiffs 
along the fence covered most of the fence area. R. 26, 
27, 45. Defendant at no time objected to plaintiffs' use 
of the yard. R. 2'7, 62. Plaintiffs first learned the descrip-
tion in the contract and the fence line did not correspond 
about January 19, 1951, which was subsequent to defend-
ant's discovery of this fact. R. 23, 24, 47. The real estate 
contract, in fact, described a strip 11 feet 9 inehes 'vide. 
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south of the fence running from the east to the west 
property lines. R. 32. 
Plaintiffs were in Blanding, Utah, when they signed 
the real estate contract which was prepared by the 
Brockbank Real Estate Company, which company made 
the sale. The description used in the contract was taken 
from an abstract of the triplex property. R. 36, 76. 
Plaintiffs have four children and their house is large. 
The only part of the yard which is level and a safe place 
for the children to play, and not bordered by a high 
retaining wall, is the back yard of the house, including 
the strip in dispute. To give the defendant this 11 ft. 
9 in. strip leaves the house with yirtually no back yard 
and without a safe area for the children to play. R. 32, 
33, 51. 
STATE~IENT OF POINT'S 
POINT I. THE MISTAKE OF FACT WAS MUTUAL. 
BOTH PARTIES ENTERED INTO THE CONTRACT, THE 
SUBJECT OF THIS ACTION, UNDER THE BELIEF THAT 
THE PROPERTY PLAINTIFFS WERE SELLING AND DE-
FENDANT WAS BUYING WAS THE TRIPLEX WITH THE 
GROUND NORTH OF THE FENCE WHICH SEPARATED 
THE HOUSE FROM THE TRIPLEX. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT IN 
THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT, OR, IF THEY 
WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE, THE COURT DID 
NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS EXCUSABLE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE MISTAKE OF FACT WAS MUTUAL. 
BOTH PARTIES ENTERED INTO THE CONTRACT, THE 
SUBJECT OF THIS ACTION, UNDER THE BELIEF THAT 
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THE PROPERTY PLAINTIFFS WERE SELLING AND DE-
FENDANT WAS BUYING WAS THE TRIPLEX WITH THE 
GROUND NORTH OF THE FENCE WHICH SEPARATED 
THE HOUSE FROM THE TRIPLEX. 
In the brief of the defendant, six statements of error 
are assigned and argued separately. Plaintiffs will an-
swer defendant's Points One to Five under Point I in 
this brief. 
Plaintiffs agree with defendant that "the law is well 
settled in this jurisdiction that a written contract will be 
reformed to express the real intention of the parties only 
where proof of the mistake is clear, definite and convinc-
ing and where the party seeking reformation is not guilty 
of negligence in drawing . the contract nor of laches in 
making timely ap-plication for the reformation." George 
v. Fritsch Loan & Trust Co., 69 Ut. 460, 256 P. 400. 
Defendant makes no claim that plaintiffs were guilty of 
laches in making application for the reformation, there-
fore, the court need consider here the questions of ( 1) 
whether the mistake was mutual and the proof thereof 
is clear, definite and convincing, and (2) whether plain-
tiffs were guilty of negligence in the execution of the 
contract. 
Plaintiffs contend earnestly that the mistake was 
mutual and that the proof of the mistake is clear, definite 
and convincing. 
Both plaintiffs testified that when they executed the 
con tract they in tended to sell . only the property north 
of the fence. R. 36, 46, 4 7. Plaintiffs first learned that 
the property described in the contract did not correspond 
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'vith the fence line in January, 1951. The fence com-
pletely separating the house and triplex was standing 
\vhen the eontract \vas executed by the parties in March 
of 19-±9. Throughout the smnmers of 1949 and 1950 
plaintiffs eontinued to use and occupy all the ground up 
to the fence as they had done in the past. They cared for 
law·n in that area and planted and cared for fio,vers in 
a garden in said area. A sprinkling system, which 
had been installed sometin1e from 1935 to 1937, which 
watered all the ground up to the fence was continued 
1n use. 
\Vhen the defendant, soon after t!1e execution of the 
contract, asked plaintiffs to sell her three or n1ore feet 
south of the fence, plaintiffs declined and told her they 
did not have enough back yard as it was. Certainly 
plaintiffs' use and care of all of the ground south of the 
fence during 1949 and 1950 and their refusal to sell any 
of that ground to the defendant establishes beyond ques-
tion that they intended in the real estate contract to sell 
the defendant only the property north of the fence. 
So much for what the plaintiffs intended. Now let 
us consider the defendant's intention when she executed 
the contract. Defendant inspected the triplex property 
twice before executing ·the earnest money agreement, 
which preceded the signing of the uniform real estate 
contract. The 4 ft. wire fence on steel poles separating 
the house fron1 the triplex was standing whe,n defendant 
inspected the triplex, and she saw that fence. R. 58, 59. 
Defendant signed the earnest money agree1nent early in 
1\farch, 1949. This agreement contains no mention of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
the size of the lot. R. 62, Ex. C. Defendant's testimony 
is that when she purchased the triplex she hadn't con-
sidered the size of the lot at all. R. 60, 63. That she 
was interested in the size of the ·rooms and that the first 
time she saw any legal description of the property was 
when she signed the re.al estate· contract and even at that 
·time she did not pay any attention to the frontage she 
was buying. R. 62, 63. Her testimony further is that 
she had no reason to believe her property extended south 
of the fence because it had been represented to her other-
wise. R. 63. Further, defendant testified that it was not 
until January, 1951, that she discovered the contract 
included land south of the fence. R. 60. And that it was 
not until after she made this discovery that she ever 
1nade any claim for any property south of the fence. 
R. 64. In approximately June of 1949, which was not 
more than three months after the execution of the con-
tract and about two months after defendant moved into 
the triplex, she asked plaintiffs to sell her three to six 
feet south of the fence. R. 28, 29, 78. Certainly the 
defendant would not have attempted to purchase· any of 
this ground from the plaintiffs if she believed she was 
already purchasing it under contract. At no time during 
the summers of 1949 or 1950 did defendant object to 
plaintiffs' use and care of all of the p·roperty south of 
the fence. R. 27. 
Certainly the defendant cannot no'v be heard to say 
in oppositon to all this conclusive evidence that when 
she executed the re-al estate contract she believed she 
was buying. land south of the fence or that the fence did 
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